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Abstract. For practitioners across a growing number of academic dis-
ciplines there is a strong sense that simulation models of complex real-
world systems provide something that diﬀers fundamentally from that
which is oﬀered by mathematical models of the same phenomena. The
precise nature of this diﬀerence has been diﬃcult to isolate and explain,
but, occasionally, it is cashed out in terms of an ability to use simulations
to perform “experiments”, e.g., [9]. The notion here is that empirical data
derived from costly experiments in the real world might usefully be aug-
mented with data harvested from the right kind of simulation models.
We will reserve the term “artiﬁcial worlds” for such simulations.
In this paper, rather than tackle the problems inherent in this type of
claim head on, we will approach them obliquely by asking: what is the
root of the attraction of constructing and exploring artiﬁcial worlds?
By combining insights drawn from the work of Levins, Braitenberg, and
Clark, we arrive at an answer that at least partially legitimises artiﬁcial
worlds by allocating them a useful scientiﬁc role, without having to assign
the status of empirical enquiry to their exploration.
Our starting point in this exercise is simulation modelling work within the
ﬁeld of artiﬁcial life, where models and artefacts (robots, artwork, “realisations”
of “digital life”, etc.) are used to explore fundamental biological questions. The
ﬁeld as a whole has struggled with the notion of a special role for simulation
models. Some attribute the status of “digital naturalism” to their use, as though
software entities represent an additional kingdom of living creatures [10]. Others
claim that they are models, but that in the right circumstances they nevertheless
have the capacity to settle empirical questions [1]. Still others have cast them as
just another kind of reasoning aid to be placed in the scientiﬁc modelling toolbox
alongside equational models, physical replicas, games, thought experiments, etc.,
being distinct from the others only in terms of their immaturity and in so far as
they involve an added layer of indirection and complicatedness brought about
by the involvement of automatic machinery [4]. One aim of the current paper is
to probe this relationship between automaticity and complicatedness.
In his seminal 1966 paper “The strategy of model building in population biol-
ogy”, Richard Levins presents a trade-oﬀ between the aims that a modeller might
attempt to meet in a single model [5]. No useful model, Levins claims, can max-
imise precision, generality and realism. Orzack and Sober [8] have shown that astrict three-way trade-oﬀ between precision, realism and generality cannot hold
since it is surely possible to decrease all three properties by simplifying a model.
In line with recent analysis by Odenbaugh [6], we argue that this fatally miscon-
strues Levins’ trade-oﬀ. Levins, in fact, explicitly invokes four inter-dependent
dimensions since he states that useful models may not simultaneously maximise
realism, generality and precision. Apparently, Levins didn’t think it necessary to
point out that increasing realism, precision and generality would not be sensible
if it were achieved at the expense of what we will term a model’s tractability:
our ability to make use of the model to shed light on the system being modelled.
That Levins felt a need to warn of the dangers inherent in attempting to build
models that are simultaneously precise, general and realistic is reason enough
to assume that seeking to combine all three properties might motivate some
modellers. Moreover, Odenbaugh’s [7] argument that Levins was responding to
a growing trend in what he termed “Fortran ecology”, the use of large computer
models that could be parameterised to represent a wide range of ecosystems and
purported to generate precise, realistic predictions, suggests that this motivation
might be felt by simulation modellers in particular. But on the face of it, the
attraction of general, precise, realistic models should be felt quite generally across
scientiﬁc modelling paradigms. Why would simulation modellers be particularly
vulnerable to it?
Braitenberg’s [2] law of “downhill design and uphill analysis” oﬀers a glimpse
of one answer by halving the notion of tractability into components related to
constructing and understanding, respectively. For manually constructed math-
ematical models these two halves are tightly coupled, proceeding in step, and
arriving either at an intelligible model or a conceptually intractable (i.e., failed)
model. However, in simulation modelling this coupling is loosened until, for some
simulations, constructing forgoes understanding. This account is redolent of work
by Clark [3] on explanation in the context of artiﬁcial neural networks, where the
automatic nature of the neural network algorithm can propel a modeller from
a competence-level description of the problem to a working implementation of
a solution without visiting the algorithmic level of representation necessary in
order to achieve an understanding of that solution. By analogy, simulation mod-
ellers enjoy increased tractability in the design phase, relying on the automaticity
of their models to produce interesting behaviour, but suﬀer during the analysis
phase where model behaviour may remain analytically intractable.
By this point we have a rather bleak account: simulation modelling of com-
plex systems can tempt modellers to build systems that are beyond their com-
prehension in a misguided eﬀort at combining generality, precision and realism.
An illusion of tractability is created by the powerful automaticity of computa-
tional tools. But there is no free lunch, in that what is won on the swings of easy
construction is lost on the roundabouts of intractable analysis. This situation
can force simulation modellers to make do with systems that are to some extent
general, precise and realistic, but not fully understood. Consequently such sys-
tems can come to resemble the mysterious real world rather than a traditional
scientiﬁc model, lending an empirical ﬂavour to their exploration.However, while there is a clear pathology at work here, there is something to
be salvaged by noting that the divide between tractable and intractable is not
set in stone. Improved physical or mechanical power can bring previously un-
scalable heights within reach. Likewise, improved simplifying assumptions, the-
oretical frameworks, representational re-descriptions, organising concepts, etc.,
can simplify previously intractable problems, bringing them within reach of ex-
isting analytical tools. Working at a “tractability ceiling” is the right place to
achieve these kinds of insight and by projecting us through such ceilings, al-
beit temporarily, even a less-than-fully understood simulation model can give
us, not a window on a new artiﬁcial world of empirical facts and ﬁndings, but a
new perspective on an existing world of ideas, assumptions, commitments and
questions.
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